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LEAD ARTICLES
SONY, NAPSTER, AND AIMSTER: AN ANALYSIS
OF DISSIMILAR APPLICATION OF THE
COPYRIGHT LAW TO SIMILAR

TECHNOLOGIES
Jeffrey R. Armstrong*
INTRODUCTION

In 1984, in the landmark case of Sony Corp of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.,' the U.S. Supreme Court determined
that a manufacturer of a videocassette recorder machine ("VCR")
could not be held responsible for the copyright infringement of
users of the VCR as a "contributory infringer." The particular
technological advance that was the subject of Sony was the
development of a machine that allowed consumers to create a
permanent and exact copy of a copyrightable video work.
In 2001, in A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,2 the Ninth
Circuit determined that the owner of an internet website, which
facilitated the sharing, between consumers, of MP3 digital files,
which are permanent and exact copies of copyrightable audio
works, could be held responsible for copyright infringement as a
. Mr. Armstrong is a principal with the Troy, New York law firm of Pattison,
Sampson, Ginsberg and Griffin, P.C., a medium size firm which practices in
Education and Intellectual Property matters. He is a graduate of Skidmore
College (1976) and attained a JD degree from Albany Law School in 1979. He
currently continues his studies at Albany Law School as a L.L.M. Candidate
(2005) with a specialization in Intellectual Property Law. He is also the Editor
of the Education Law Update, a monthly newsletter published by the Hudson
Mohawk Association of Colleges and Universities, and lectures frequently for
that organization and others on Education and Intellectual Property Law matters.
His areas of practice include Education Law, Intellectual Property Law, and
Corporate and Business Law.
1. Sony Corp of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
2. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 ( 9th Cir. 2001).
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"contributory infringer." In 2002, in the case of In re Aimster,3 the
court, confronting a software-based system that was similar in
basic function to the system addressed in Napster, also held the
system owner liable as a "contributory infringer."
Clearly, some explanation is necessary to ascertain why it is that
these courts, all addressing seemingly similar technologies, would
come to exactly opposite results. This paper intends to address
this quandary. Part I of the paper will offer a brief history of the
U.S. Copyright Act with regard to the right to copy and distribute
copyrighted material, and will also examine in detail the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Sony. Part II of the paper will examine
the legal reasoning of the courts in the Napster and Aimster
decisions, and will also examine the technology which was under
review in the two cases, in order to determine what, if any, factual
and/or legal distinctions between these cases can be drawn. Part
III will examine the effect of this precedent on other emergent
forms of file copying and distribution products and systems and
offer alternative theories for the determination of contributory
copyright infringement for the manufacturers and suppliers of
these new technologies.
I. THE SONY DECISION AND ITS HISTORY

It has been dryly observed by at least one commentator that,
since its inception, American copyright law has shown what has
seemed to be outright hostility toward new technologies that could
be viewed as a challenge to a content owner's ability to enforce his
or her copyright.' But in true capitalistic spirit, copyright law has
always seemed to adjust to the new use - and often has created in
the process a new and lucrative source of revenue for the very
copyright holders who had been so opposed to the new
technology.'
Examples of legally resolved controversies
3. In re Aimster, 2002 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 17054 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2002).
4. Damien A. Riehl, Electronic Commerce in the 21st Century: Article Peer
to Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella, and Freenet Create a
Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?,27 WM. MITCHELL L.REV. 1761 (2001).
5. id. at 1763.
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concerning such new technology which in fact have opened new
opportunities for copyright content owners include early court
contests involving piano rolls,6 the phonograph,7 and cable
television.8
So it should have come as no surprise when
controversy erupted over the development of the VCR in the early
1970's.
This dispute came at an interesting time in the development of
copyright law, as the U.S. Congress had in 1976 just passed a
comprehensive overhaul of the thoroughly antiquated 1909 law.
One of the most noteworthy aspects of the 1976 revision was the
statutory codification of the "fair use" defense. 9 Section 107 of the
new statute provides as follows:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 106 and 106A, the
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction
in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
the nature of the copyrighted work;
6. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908),
(holding the creation of piano rolls based from copyrighted musical
compositions, without more, did not violate the Copyright Law).
7. Stem v. Rosey, 17 App.D.C. 562 (1901), (holding that no actionable
infringement occurred because the newly developed wax cylinders at issue were
no different than the "metal cylinder of the old and familiar music box" which
"had never been regarded as infringing upon the copyright of authors and
publishers").
8. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artist Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968),
(holding the transmission of copyrighted broadcast television material was not
infringement because no "performance", as required under the U.S. Copyright
Act, occurred. Note, however, that this case has been statutorily abrogated by
the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541).

9. 17 U.S.C. §107 (1994).
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the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work."
Interestingly, even though VCR technology was in common use
by the time of the 1976 codification of the fair use defense, review
of the statute reveals that Congress did not explicitly address the
emerging VCR technology within the statutory definition of fair
use. In fact, it appears that Congress had chosen to ignore the
budding VCR controversy."0 It was therefore left to the courts to
determine whether and to what extent fair use applied to VCR
copying of copyrighted material.
A.

The Sony Decision

The case of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios"
concerned a claim by representatives of the film industry against a
manufacturer of the VCR, which was based on theories of
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. Universal
alleged that defendant Sony was liable for the direct copyright
infringement of those customers by its manufacture and sale of
VCR machines to consumers which provided those consumers
with the ability to duplicate copyright material, thereby allegedly
infringing the content owner's copyright. The U.S. Supreme Court
held in favor of Sony. First, in a factual holding that would have
great significance in later years, the Court determined that the
"principal" use of the VCR by customers was the "time-shifting"
of copyrighted television broadcasts (i.e. a taping of a program by
the consumer with the VCR so that the consumer could watch the
broadcast at a different time). 2 The Supreme Court noted that the
lower court had found as a factual matter that there was a
significant likelihood that copyright holders would not object to
having their broadcast "time shifted" by consumers. 3 The Court
10.
11.
12.
13.

See Sony, 464 U.S. at 431.
464 U.S. 417(1994).
Id. at 421.
Id. at 443-445.
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then determined that it was unlikely that such time shifting would
cause harm to the market for, or value of, the copyrighted work. 4
Therefore, according to the Court, the VCR's werc capable of a
"substantial non-infringing use", which qualified for fair use
protection.15 This fair use by consumers, held the Court, had the
consequence of shielding Sony from liability against contributory
or vicarious copyright infringement because the consumer using
the VCR was principally using it for a legal use (i.e. time shifting)
and as a result Sony should not be held contributorily liable, even
if a consumer went beyond fair use and actually used the VCR to
directly infringe a copyright owner's right. 6
In order to arrive at this holding of substantial non-infringing
use, the Court decided to borrow and apply to this copyright law
case an arcane patent law doctrine known as the "staple article of
commerce" theory. 7 The doctrine had previously been used to
insulate the manufacturers of products, which might be used by
customers to infringe another's patent rights, from liability so long
as the product was a "staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial non-infringing use."" The Court held that
application of this patent doctrine to a copyright case was
appropriate because in both patent and copyright law the
contributory infringement doctrine was grounded on the
recognition that adequate protection of a monopoly may require
the courts to look beyond actual duplication of a device or
publication to the product or activities that made such duplication
possible. 9 The staple article of commerce doctrine, the Court
held, struck an appropriate balance between a copyright holder's
legitimate demand for effective protection of the statutory
monopoly and the right of others to freely engage in substantially
14. Id. at 453-455.

15. 464 U.S. at 456.
16. Id. at 436-442.
17. Stacey L. Dogan, Perspectives on Intellectual Propertv: Is Napster a
VCR? The Complications of Sony for Napster and Other Internet Technologie
52 Hastings L.J. 939 (2001).
18. 464 US at 441. See also, Dogan, supra note 17 at 944.

19. Id. at 442.
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unrelated areas of commerce."
As will be seen, the adoption of the staple article of commerce
doctrine as a method to define liability in Sony has created
significant repercussions as the judicial treatment of copying
technology, and the technology itself, began to evolve.
II. THE NAPSTER AND AIMSTER DECISIONS

In order to adequately explain Napster, this paper first must
define two technologies. The first technology is referred to as
MPEG Audio Layer III ("MP3") file compression; the second is
"Peer to Peer" ("P2P") file sharing.
A.

MP3 File Compression

MP3 is the shortened name for MPEG-I Layer III, which is an
audio subset of the MPEG industry standard for the compression
of certain digital computer files. 21 The use of this compression
technology has greatly simplified the copying and distribution of
digital music files.
Specifically, each commercial CD sold
contains songs in a digital format known as a .WAV file); because
the MP3 compression technology compresses these large (typically
40 to 100 MB) .WAV sound files at a 12:1 ratio, it thereby creates
much smaller files that can be transferred from computer to
computer, either directly or through downloading via the Internet,
quickly and inexpensively. Moreover, the sound quality of these
MP3 files can often be of a very high caliber and nearly
indistinguishable from the original.
B. P2P File Sharing
Peer to Peer file sharing (sometimes also referred to as "file20. Id. at 442.
21. The History of MP3 and How Did It All Begin? at http://www.mp3mac.com/Pages/Historyof MP3.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2002).
22. Mary Jane Frisby, Rockin' Down the Highway: Forging a Path for the
Lawful Use of MP3 DigitalMusic Files, 33 IND. L. REV. 317, 319 (1999).
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swapping") technology is a sub-set of software applications which
enable one internet user to directly access the hard drive of another
internet user's computer and directly download any files that are
available for sharing on that second user's hard drive without the
need for a central server acting as a storage site for the file.23
C. The Napster Decision
MP3 music files first began to be traded over the Internet
beginning in the early 1990's. Hundreds, and then thousands of
websites sprang up, which were hosted by internet-savvy music
enthusiasts who had "ripped" (i.e. used a software program which
converted .WAV files from commercially purchased CD's to
MP3's) unauthorized MP3 copies of popular songs and then posted
them on their websites for free download by any other internet user
who visited the site.24
Then, in 1994, an enterprising 19 year old college student named
Shawn Fanning developed and made available to internet users
(free of charge, of course) on his website a software program
which bypassed what were then cumbersome search methods used
by internet users to locate particular songs that were posted on
Fanning dubbed his new system
these internet websites.
"Napster." His software allowed users to upload the name of the
songs stored on his or her hard drive to a centralized database and
thereby allow other users to select songs for download from that
index. Under this system, no MP3 file was ever present on a
Napster-owned server. 2' This system understandably aroused the
ire of the music industry and a lawsuit which alleged contributory
and vicarious copyright infringement against Napster's owner
ultimately ensued.
On February 12, 2001 following a lengthy battle in the lower
courts, the Ninth Circuit, in a lawsuit filed by the Recording
23. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004, 1011-12

( 9 th

Cir.

2001).
24. Corey Rayburn, After Napster,6 VAJ. L. & TECH. 16. (2001).
25. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
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Industry of America, and other music industry stakeholders,
upheld an injunction which required that Napster block the file
transfer traffic of all copyrighted sound recordings whose title and
artist name were identified by the plaintiff.
The Napster Court first determined that Napster users
themselves clearly infringed the distribution rights of owners of
musical works when they downloaded MP3 files that contained
copyrighted material.26 The Court then determined that because
Napster knowingly encouraged and assisted its users in such illegal
activity, and materially assisted the infringing activity, it was liable
for contributory infringement.27
The key issue addressed in Napster, as it was in Sony, was the
issue of the defense of fair use, and specifically the concept of
"commercially significant non-infringing use."
Napster's
attorneys argued that Napster users engaged in fair use because:
(1) MP3 files that were not protected by copyright were traded
over the Napster System; (2) all Napster users were really doing
with all this downloading was "sampling," or making temporary
copies of a copyrighted work before purchasing; and (3) in a clever
twist on the Sony holding, that Napster users were merely "spaceshifting" an audio file they already owned in audio CD format.28
Consequently, according to this logic, Napster, like the Sony VCR,
could therefore be used for commercially significant noninfringing uses, and consequently Napster could not be held
contributorily responsible.29
The Napster Court disagreed, disposing of the fair use
arguments with the curt observation that while "we are bound to
follow Sony," Sony was distinguishable because the Napster
defendants, unlike the defendants in Sony, had actual knowledge of
infringing activities of its customers, and thus "Sony's holding [is]
of limited assistance to Napster."3 The Napster Court
also
summarily stated that Sony's staple article of commerce doctrine
26. Id. at 1014.
27. Id. at 1020-22.

28. Idat 1014.
29. Id. at 1014.
30. Id. at 1020.
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has no application to the Napster system because of the high level
of actual knowledge by the Napster system owners of the illegal
activities of its customers and its direct ability to prevent those
activities.31
At least one commentator3 2 has observed that the two courts'
analysis of the staple article of commerce doctrine is the key to
understanding the distinction between the holdings in the two
cases. Since Sony involved a one-time product sale, it never
addressed what became a core issue in Napster: whether the staple
article of commerce doctrine would apply to a defendant whose
continuing relationship with the direct infringer gave the defendant
at least the theoretical ability to prevent acts of infringement as
they occur.33
This observation may well be of great significance. The next
(and at this writing, most recent) case to grapple with peer to peer
MP3 file distribution systems was the September 4, 2002 decision
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, entitled "In Re: Aimster Copyright Litigation."34
As will be seen, how Sony and Napster treated the staple article of
commerce theory is critically important to the court's ultimate
decision in Aimster.
D. The Aimster Decision
The Aimster system (later renamed "Madster" by its owner,
Johnny Deep, following a dispute with America Online) was a
software program, which, after download and installation on a
user's computer, allowed that user to communicate with other
Aimster users by "instant messaging" and thereby transfer MP3
files. Significantly, unlike the Napster system, no central file
server owned by Aimster was ever used as the repository of an
index of song names; the users communicated the names of their
stored songs entirely through the software program, although the
31.
32.
33.
34.

Napster,supra note 25 at 1020.
Dogan, supra note 17.
Id. at 949.
Supra note 3.
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court found as a factual matter that the Aimster file servers did
facilitate user file distribution by other means.35
Like Napster, Aimster was soon the target of the Recording
Industry of America with a lawsuit filed which alleged liability
based on contributory copyright infringement. The court, while
taking surprising pains to state that it did not consider Napster of
precedential value,36 held against Aimster. It found as a factual
matter that there "can be no doubt" that the Aimster system owners
either knew or should have known that their users infringed
copyright holders' rights.37 The court explicitly held that Aimster
directly, and in a material way, contributed to the infringing
activities of its users, memorably stating, "Defendants managed to
do everything but actually steal the music off the store shelves and
hand it to Aimster's users."38
The Aimster court, like the panel in Napster, took great pains to
distinguish Sony. The Aimster court placed heavy emphasis on the
stated factual determination of the Sony court that the "principal
use" of VCRs recorders was time-shifting and therefore a noninfringing use.39 Second, it held that Sony applied only to a "staple
article of commerce." Importantly, the Aimster court extensively
explained that Sony had really centered on the fact that the VCR
was a "product" sold by the defendant that provided the means for
copying and thus created no ongoing relationship between Sony
and the users of the product. The Aimster system, the court held,
was very different than Sony in that it was a service, not a product
being sold, and it involved an ongoing relationship rather than a
single sale.
Thus Aimster essentially held that a VCR was different than the
Aimster file swapping software program, and should be treated
differently under the law, because (1) The VCR was a product
35. Id. at 17054.
36. The Napster Court explicitly observed that "our decision today need not
rest on the legal reasoning of factual findings of the Napster Courts"; See In re
Aimster, supra note 3 at 17058.
37. Id. at 17089.
38. Id. at 17096.
39. Id. at 17097.
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which, after its sale, involved no continuing relationship between
manufacturer and user, and the Aimster software program was not;
and (2) The VCR was principally used for time swapping which is
a substantially non-infringing use, while the Aimster software
program was not principally used for time swapping and thus did
not have a substantially non-infringing use.
Unfortunately, it can be argued that the logical predicates upon
which both factual distinctions rely are wrong. First, while there is
no doubt that the VCR is a product, it can also be plausibly argued
that the Aimster software program is also a product. Clearly, the
most important item that Aimster supplied to its customers was a
single software program which, standing alone, enables one user's
computer to communicate with another user's computer. No real
"system" was ever really created by Aimster, although, to be fair,
the Aimster court undeniably stressed that Aimster greatly
facilitated the communication between users with such centrally
operated features as "chat rooms," "message boards" and other
services hosted on the Aimster website.4 ° However, in a critical
difference, Aimster, unlike Napster, did not use a central server as
a repository of song titles; the users traded this information
directly between themselves through "instant messages".
Furthermore, and despite the Aimster court's pronouncement that
Aimster "controls" its users, it appears that the Aimster software
program, after download by customers, can no longer be controlled
by anyone, including Aimster. Therefore as long as there are at
least two computers connected to the internet that have the
Aimster software program running, those users themselves can
continue, perhaps indefinitely, to communicate and distribute files
with each other, regardless of Aimster.
Thus, there is a very real factual issue whether, from a purely
technological point of view, Aimster should be deemed, like Sony,
to have supplied a "product" to users that after "manufacture"
involved no continuing relationship between manufacturer and
user. Interestingly, in November of 2002, the Recording Industry
of America apparently filed a contempt proceeding against
40. Id. at 17063.
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Aimster alleging that it has violated the injunction that was issued
in September 2002; Aimster has filed papers in opposition,
asserting the defense that it is powerless to stop its users due to the
technical structure of the software program.4 1
Moreover, while it is probably undisputable that the Aimster
software program is not principally used for "time-swapping" or
some other non-infringing use, it is also certainly arguable that
VCR's are also not principally used for time swapping, at least not
now, 20 years after the Sony decision. While time-swapping could
have been one of the uses of a VCR in 1984 that use presupposes
that the tape was thereafter destroyed. It is submitted that, in fact,
the principal use of a VCR was, or at least certainly has become,
the creation of a permanent and unquestionably illegal copy of
copyrighted video content.
Moreover, with today's premium
video content distributed via digital cable systems, it is highly
likely that a VCR in 2002 is predominantly used to make and keep
a perfect copy of a favorite movie so as not to have to purchase
another one for repeated home viewing.
Is this really
"substantially non-infringing use?"
III. THE ROAD AHEAD

Critical examination of the legal reasoning of the Aimster
decision brings the flaws of the Sony decision into sharp focus. In
Sony, the Supreme Court was confronted with an undeniably
vexing issue without the benefit of adequate statutory guidance.
Perhaps even more frustrating to the Court was the fact that
Congress had, just eight short years before, completely revised the
Copyright Law and had unmistakably refused to deal with the
impending problem that VCR technology would unquestionably
become. So, the Court went ahead, as it had to, and made new law
on the fly, borrowing the arcane patent law concept of the "staple
article of commerce" and grafting it onto copyright law. In order
to logically use the "staple article of commerce" doctrine,

41. See Jeremy Boyer, Group Pushes to Stop Madster, ALBANY TIMES
UNION. November 22. 2002.
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however, the Court had to find as a factual matter that the principal
use of this copying devise was in fact a non-infringing one. The
Court therefore seized on the idea that all that was happening was
that users were "time-shifting" copyrighted material and there was
nothing inherently illegal about that.
Unfortunately, things change. Technological advances now
provide virtually every consumer with the ability to make flawless
copies of copyrighted audio and video material, and to freely
distribute this material to any other user in any other country in the
world over the internet in minutes or even seconds. Television and
motion picture habits have also dramatically changed in the past
20 years, with DVD and VCR viewing now dwarfing actual
motion picture attendance; according to recent surveys, box office
revenues make up less than a quarter of a film's total take, with the
largest amount coming from rental and sales of DVD's.42
There is, of course, no doubt that there is a very real difference
between the Sony case on the one hand and the Napster and
Aimster decisions on the other. Clearly, a manufacturer of a VCR
probably should not, from a social policy point of view, be held
liable for the possibly infringing use by customers of that product.
Napster and Aimster, on the other hand, as one commentator has
vividly noted, represent the "dark side" of peer to peer
technology,43 and probably should, from a social point of view, be
held liable for contributory copyright infringement. It is probably
indisputable that the systems in Napster and Aimster, unlike
Sony's manufacture of a VCR, were created for the sole purpose
of assisting its users to infringe.
The next legal battle over peer-to-peer file transfer technology
will probably involve systems that are completely decentralized;
file systems such as KaZaa and Gnutella are completely softwarebased, with absolutely no central server involved in any way."
42. See Frank Ahrens, Hollywood Sees the Picture with DVD's,
WASHINGTON POST, October 7, 2002.
43. Hisanani Harry Tanaka, Post-Napster: Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
Systems: Current and Future Issues of Secondary Liability Under Copyright
Laws in the United States and Japan,22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV 37 (2001).
44. Id. at 56-57.
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Are these new technologies a "product" or are they a "service?"
Can the makers of these software programs be deemed to have
"control" over the activities of their users, and, if so, what factors
should be utilized to examine whether such control is present? Can
liability ever be rationally imposed upon an individual who merely
devises a software program that can be used by another to
infringe?
These questions serve to highlight the fact that this precedent
has become unworkable as an effective tool to evaluate the
liability of sponsors or manufacturers of file copying and
distribution technology. Clearly, there is no rational distinction
that can be drawn between a file copying "product" and a file
copying "service." Just as clearly, the issue of whether the liability
of a sponsor or manufacturer of a file distribution product or
service should be based on the relatively insignificant issue of
whether the system or product can be independently operated by
an individual after it has left the hands of the sponsor or
manufacturer is an equally irrational determinative factor in this
analysis.
It can therefore certainly be argued that this precedent should be
overturned or statutorily abrogated. In its place, a system could be
devised which would place less emphasis on the particular file
copying and/or distribution technology employed (and no
emphasis on the technologically insignificant issue of whether the
file copying system is a "product" or a "system") and more on the
basic question of whether the acts or omissions of the defendant
materially contributed to the ultimate infringement by another.
Perhaps this analysis could be sharpened by establishing a number
of factors that a court should consider in its evaluation. For
example, one factor that could certainly be examined is whether
the alleged contributory infringer retained any meaningful control
over the system/product after sale. Another perhaps more
important factor analysis could be a consideration of whether there
was a sufficient proximate relationship between the
system/product that was created and the resulting infringing
activity. So, for example, a manufacturer of a CD RW would not
be held responsible for contributory infringement because of a
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more perceived remoteness between the manufacture of such a
device that can be used for a multitude of purposes and a device
which, fairly stated, can be used for only one purpose infringement. This shift in reasoning would move a court's
analysis away from the less important issue of whether the
"principal" use of a product/service is a non-infringing one in
favor of the more significant issue of determining whether the
infringing use is only one of a multitude of other uses for the
product/service, some of which are non-infringing. Another test
could be whether the alleged contributory infringer has invented or
developed something that causally creates enough infringement
activity to have an adverse financial effect on the expected market
for the copyrighted content that would typically be infringed by
the product/system in question. Perhaps other factors which
represent societal interests at stake could also be listed so as to
require a balancing analysis such as: whether the product/system
has the potential of serving or enhancing other societal goals such
as facilitating efficient and inexpensive delivery and distribution of
information throughout society; whether the technology itself that
is involved in the copying/distribution product/system is
independently important from a scientific point of view and should
be immune from this potential liability on policy grounds; or
whether the imposition of contributory infringement liability could
serve to inhibit the advancement of technological development in
the field. This list of factors is of course a sampling only; its intent
is merely to demonstrate that a system can be devised which could
center the attention of the fact finder, whether court or jury, on a
more measured analysis of whether the actions of the defendant
should legally and factually be viewed as materially contributing
to the infringing activities of others. A factor analysis, it is
submitted, that does not rely on an artificial distinctions between a
"product" versus a "service" on one hand, or trying to freeze a
moment in time in order to arbitrarily determine what the
"principal use" of a dynamic technology might be, on the other.
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CONCLUSION

Perhaps what is revealed most clearly in the analysis of Sony,
Napster and Aimster, and their efforts to determine the appropriate
level of liability for contributory copyright infringement against
manufacturers of products/systems which can be used to assist
others in violating the Copyright Law, is the inevitable pattern of
the legal system once again stumbling into illogical and
unsupportable results when it tries to make old law fit new
technology. As has become clear, the earnest efforts of the Sony
Court to step into the vacuum created by Congress when it ignores
the VCR controversy in the late 1970's in its passage of the new
Copyright Law have ultimately served to create a legal framework
that has already become unworkable. The logical and legal
distinctions that have been made thus far in this line of cases are
sharply inconsistent and can therefore be criticized as arbitrary.
Logically flawed precedent is the result, with no settled and
consistent rules of interpretation provided which could serve to
reasonably assist courts in determining what is infringing behavior
and what is not. While it is certainly a societal goal to reduce
copyright infringement, doing so by the application of flawed legal
and factual reasoning may ultimately lead to unintended and even
unjust results.
This precedent should be overturned or statutorily abrogated,
and in its place, a system should be devised which would place
less emphasis on the particular method of file copying employed
and more on the more essential question of whether the acts or
omissions of the defendant materially contributed to the ultimate
infringement by another. Unless this occurs, one thing is quite
clear. This battle over file copying and distribution technology
will doubtless continue until the highly ambiguous precedent
established by Sony is revisited and clarified either by the U.S.
Supreme Court or by Congress.
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